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Machina (2007) formulates a number of experiments, and shows that they can be
used to test the Choquet expected utility model. We show that one of them can also be
used to test the class of maxmin expected utility preferences in Klibanoﬀ (2001). Those
preferences are not Choquet expected utility preferences, and they are not consistent
with Choquet expected utility preferences in Machina’s experiment.




Machina (2007) formulates a number of Ellsberg-style (Ellsberg, 1961) experiments. One of
them, in our view the simplest one, is as follows.1 There is a coin and an urn in front of
you. You are told that the coin is unbiased, and the urn contains one hundred balls; each
ball in the urn can be either black or white, but the relative proportions are not speciﬁed
(that is, there may be from zero to one hundred black/white balls). The coin will be ﬂipped
once, and one ball will be drawn from the urn. Consider, for instance, f1 in Figure 1. It is a
typical act, with a payoﬀ of $0 if h (head) comes up in the coin ﬂip, and a b (black) ball is
drawn from the urn; $100 if t (tail) comes up in the coin ﬂip, and a w (white) ball is drawn
from the urn, etc. Similar interpretations are given to f2, f3 and f4.
In the above setting, the state space is Sr × Sa = {h,t} × {b,w}, where Sr involves risk,
and Sa involves ambiguity. In general, an act f : Sr × Sa → R speciﬁes the monetary payoﬀ
f(sr,sa) you receive at every state (sr,sa) ∈ Sr × Sa. Let % be your preference relation
over acts, with  and ∼ the induced strict preference and indiﬀerence relations, respectively.
Since f1 and f4 (similarly, f2 and f3) are equivalent in substance, there is no question that
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1We are talking about Example A3 in the Appendix of Machina’s paper (the version dated July 22),

















Figure 1: Machina’s experiment
any reasonable % must conform to one of the following three patterns:
f1 ∼ f2 ∼ f3 ∼ f4 (1)
f1 ∼ f4  f2 ∼ f3 (2)
f2 ∼ f3  f1 ∼ f4. (3)
As Machina explains, only f1 ∼ f2 ∼ f3 ∼ f4 is consistent with Choquet expected utility
preferences (Schmeidler, 1989). So this experiment can be used to test the Choquet expected
utility model. Machina oﬀers various arguments that f1 and f2 are diﬀerent in substance,
and therefore f1 ∼ f2 ∼ f3 ∼ f4 might not hold. However, he does not really say that this
preference pattern should not hold.
The maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) is the classic alterna-
tive to Choquet expected utility. Conﬁning to environments that are perfectly illustrated by
the above experiment, Klibanoﬀ (2001) provides axiomatic characterizations for a speciﬁc
class of maxmin expected utility preferences. Loosely speaking, when a decision maker faces
two dimensions of uncertainty, he may have expected utility preference over acts deﬁned on
one dimension, and ambiguity averse preference over acts on the other dimension; moreover,
he may feel that the two dimensions are independent. The class of maxmin expected utility
preferences with Klibanoﬀ’s structure is capable of reﬂecting these features. As Klibanoﬀ ar-
gues, that subset of maxmin expected utility has important implications, such as preference
for randomization.
While Machina does not argue against f1 ∼ f2 ∼ f3 ∼ f4, Klibanoﬀ in eﬀect does.
In this note, we show that Klibanoﬀ’s maxmin expected utility preferences must deliver
f2 ∼ f3  f1 ∼ f4. Thus, the experiment can also be used to test the validity of those
preferences.2
2 Maxmin expected utility preferences
Since the unbiased coin and the ambiguous urn are two completely separate objects, you
know that the probability law governing Sr × Sa is a product measure, assigning marginal
probability 1/2 to each “row” (h or t); but the marginal probability of each “column” (b or
2Klibanoﬀ (p. 609, Table 2) has an experiment, which can also be used to test his maxmin expected
utility model (Klibanoﬀ, p. 614, Remark 1). But that experiment cannot be used to distinguish his model
from Choquet expected utility (Klibanoﬀ, p. 617, Remark 5).
2w) is unknown. Under this circumstance, Klibanoﬀ (p. 612, Theorem 1) would argue that






where u: R → R is a strictly increasing vNM index, and ∆ is a closed and convex set of








p(Sr × sa) = x >
1
2
∀sa ∈ Sa. (6)
Eq. (4) is a general maxmin expected utility function. The intuition is that ∆ represents
the beliefs of the decision maker, and each act is evaluated according to its minimum ex-
pected utility, where the minimum is taken over all the probability measures in ∆. The
restrictions in Eqs. (5) and (6) reﬂect both ambiguity aversion and the information structure
of the experiment. To elaborate, the decision maker thinks that the rows are stochastically
independent of the columns (∆ contains only product measures), every row occurs with prob-
ability 1/2, and every column occurs with probability between 1 − x and x. The decision
maker is ambiguity averse (x > 1/2), which is consistent with the typical preference pattern
in Ellsberg’s experiment.
It follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1993, p. 40, Propositions 2.1 and 2.2) and
Klibanoﬀ (p. 615, Theorem 2) that none of the preference relations satisfying Eqs. (4)–(6) is
a Choquet expected utility preference. So the natural question follows: When restricted to
the experiment, are these maxmin expected utility preferences consistent with Choquet ex-
pected utility? Without loss of generality, let u($0) = 0, u($100) = 1, and u($200) = y > 1.
According to Eqs. (4)–(6),
U(f1) = min
p∈∆




























2 if y > 2.
Given y > 1, we have U(f2) > U(f1) if and only if x > 1/2. One can also easily verify U(f1) =
U(f4) and U(f2) = U(f3). So, not only that these maxmin expected utility preferences are
inconsistent with Choquet expected utility in the experiment, they all deliver the same
preference pattern.
3Proposition 1. Suppose that % is represented by Eqs. (4)–(6). Then f2 ∼ f3  f1 ∼ f4.
Note that if x = 1 and y = 2, then U(f1) = 1/2 and U(f2) = 1. This is consistent
with Robert Nau’s observation (mentioned in Machina, p. 12) that the expected value of f2
must be $100, but the expected value of f1 could be as low as $50, and as high as $150.
Proposition 1 is much more general than Nau’s observation. If you are ambiguity averse,
and ﬁnd Klibanoﬀ convincing, then no matter how much ambiguity aversion you have, and
no matter what risk attitude you have, you strictly prefer f2 over f1.
3 Stochastically independent preferences
From now on, an act may be denoted using a 2×2 matrix of numbers; for instance, the act
























































This deﬁnition (strictly speaking, Eq. (7) only) is adopted by Klibanoﬀ (pp. 611–612). It is
obvious that any % represented by Eqs. (4)–(6) is stochastically independent. We are led
to explore the question: How would stochastically independent (but not necessarily maxmin
expected utility) preferences behave in Machina’s experiment?
Say that % is monotonic (strictly monotonic, respectively) if for any two acts f and g
with f 6= g,
f(sr,sa) ≥ g(sr,sa) ∀(sr,sa) ∈ Sr × Sa =⇒ f % g (f  g,respectively).
Naturally, we restrict attention to (strictly) monotonic preferences.3 Also, suppose f2 ∼ f3,
f1 ∼ f4, and there exist pr ∈ R and pa ∈ R such that

100 − pr 100 − pr














0 200 + pa




200 + pa 0
200 + pa 0

. (9)















. If % is (weakly) risk averse in
the sense that pr ≥ 0, and % is monotonic, then
f2 %

0 100 − pr
200 100 − pr

. (10)
Eqs. (7), (8) and (9) imply

0 100 − pr




100 − pr 100 − pr




0 200 + pa
100 − pr 100 − pr

. (11)
3Any % represented by Eqs. (4)–(6) is monotonic (strictly monotonic if x < 1).




0 200 + pa
100 − pr 100 − pr

. (12)
It can be established along the same line that
f3 %

100 − pr 100 − pr
200 + pa 0

. (13)










. Eqs. (12) and (13) provide a partial answer to
our question.
Proposition 2. Suppose that % is risk neutral (in the sense that pr = 0), ambiguity averse
(in the sense that pa > 0), strictly monotonic, and stochastically independent. Then f2 ∼
f3  f1 ∼ f4.
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